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Available online 8 June 2020AbstractThis paper investigates the effects of corruption on the performance of newly established enterprises. Using longitudinal data from enterprise
surveys containing virtually all firms over the period from 2011 to 2015 in Vietnam, we find that corruption deteriorates firm financial per-
formance, and subsequently exposes them to a greater failure probability. We further find that, while corruption imposes more harmful effects on
the performance and survival of private domestic firms, it exerts no significant impact on state-owned firms. On the other hand, foreign firms are
also able to take advantage of corruption to enhance their performance and survivability. In addition, our results suggest that the more mature
firms are better at dealing with corruption and can eventually take advantage of it to enhance their performance. The results are robust after
various model specifications as well as alternative classifications of newly established firms.
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Entrepreneurship is acknowledged as one of the key factors
that facilitates productivity (Erken, Donselaar, & Thurik,
2016), innovation (Sahut & Peris-Ortiz, 2014), employment
opportunities (Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, & Miranda,
2014), competition (Wennekers & Thurik, 1999), and ulti-
mately, economic growth (Baumol & Strom, 2007; Galindo &
Mendez-Picazo, 2013). However, a large number of firms have
not lived up to expectations and suffer failure in the early
stages of the corporate life cycle (Cefis & Marsili, 2011). In
this context, entrepreneurship research has devoted significant
efforts in examining factors which affect the performance of* Corresponding author. University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK.
E-mail address: nhl3@st-andrews.ac.uk (H.N. Luu).
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2214-8450/Copyright © 2020, Borsa _Istanbul Anonim Şirketi. Production and hos
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).newly established enterprises. These studies focus on the role
of entrepreneurs’ characteristics, such as gender (Kalleberg &
Leicht, 1991), age (Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne, & Cardon,
2010) and qualification (Bates, 2005), as well as firm-specific
attributes such as financial resources (Sandberg & Hofer,
1987), operational strategies (Brüderl, Preisend€orfer, &
Ziegler, 1992) and human and social capital (Cooper,
Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994; Santarelli & Tran, 2013).
Despite this large amount of literature, scholars have given
much less attention to the broader environment in which firms
operate. While some studies suggest that new firms with little
control over the external environment are typically susceptible
to exogenous pressures (Box, 2008; Shepherd, Douglas, &
Shanley, 2000), particularly institutional impacts (Gaur &
Lu, 2007), we are not aware of any study that explicitly in-
vestigates the role of corruption in shaping the performance
and sustainability of newly established enterprises. This studyting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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first empirical analyses on the effect of corruption on the
performance of newly established firms.
Arguably, corruption can be either grease-the-wheels or
sand-the-wheels for firms. On the one hand, corruption could
help firms to circumvent cumbersome rigid regulations
(Dreher & Gassebner, 2013; Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964),
and speed up the slow-moving provision of public services
(Bailey, 1966; Lui, 1985). Research (e.g., Huntington, 1968;
Leff, 1964) shows that firms are often involved in informal
payments for public favours such as tax incentives, subsidies,
government contracts or acquiring important licenses. On the
other hand, corruption can be deleterious to business activities
since it is an ‘additional tax’ that directly increases firms'
operational costs (Fisman & Svensson, 2007; Wei, 2000),
drains away the scarce resources that are vital for firm per-
formance and survivability (Cooper et al., 1994; Kaufmann &
Wei, 1999; Santarelli & Tran, 2013), and accelerates opera-
tional risk due to the unpredictability and unenforceability of
the illegal bureaucratic requests (Svensson, 2005; Wei, 1997).
For new firms, the levels of risk and costs associated with
corruption can be excessively high because they often lack
business skills and market information required to deal with
environmental pressures (Shepherd et al., 2000). In addition,
in the allocation of public resources, corrupt public officials
with discretionary power usually prioritise more established
firms with strong ties and close alignments of interests. Thus,
they could be more likely to impose extra delays and diffi-
culties to extract bribes from new firms that are less connected.
As a result, although bribes could be used in exchange for
certain favours, it is unlikely that new firms have established
sufficiently close relationships with public officials to gain
advantages through bribery (Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986).
The effect of corruption on firm performance might also
vary across firms with different types of ownership. While
corruption can be harmful to the performance of private firms
(Nguyen & Van Dijk, 2012), it may not hamper state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). This is because a close relationship and
mutual share of benefits with governments may shield the
SOEs from the negative effects of government expropriation,
such as the use of bureaucrats’ discretionary impositions to
manipulate the regulatory regime, and extract bribes from
firms (Hellman, Jones, & Kaufmann, 2003). As corrupt
transactions are kept discrete, governments often trust firms
with a high degree of connection. Therefore, the SOEs would
have a higher chance to pursue rent-seeking, receive a
disproportionate share of public favours such as better access
to loans, more favourable regulations and policies, as well as
more subsidies and tax incentives. Earlier literature about
foreign firms often documents mixed evidence on how local
corruption affects their operating outcomes. While some
studies posit that corruption exerts a negative impact on
foreign direct investment (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Wei, 2000),
others contend that the impact can be positive (Egger &
Winner, 2005; Helmy, 2013). As setting up a new foreign
plant involves complicated bureaucratic procedures, foreign
firms might be willing to pay bribes to shorten their entryprocess (Meyer, 2001) and gain access to lucrative government
contracts (Egger & Winner, 2005).
Inquiries into the role of corruption in determining the
performance of new firms in transition economies are limited.
Cuervo-Cazurra (2008) and Iwasaki and Suzuki (2012) argue
that, in the communist regions, corruption is rampant, and it is
the cause of grave economic and social issues. During the
transition period, where inconsistent law enforcement, unclear
and rapid changing regulations, and a weak juristic system co-
exist, corruption emerges more as self-interest. Government
officials are given discretionary powers to pursue their own
self-interests and privately charge bribes, which consequently
imposes greater costs and risks on firms (Iwasaki & Suzuki,
2012). Nevertheless, in many transition economies, corrup-
tion is still perceived as a necessary social evil that enables
firms to overcome various difficulties. Thus, whether corrup-
tion is a necessary evil that facilitates firm performance, or is
more about self-interest that is harmful to firms, is still an open
empirical question.
This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by providing
evidence of the effects of corruption on the operating outcomes
of newly established firms in a transition economy. From the
Annual Enterprises Survey (AES) conducted by the General
Statistics Office (GSO) of Vietnam and the Provincial
Competitive Index (PCI) provided by the Vietnam Chamber of
Commerce and Industry (VCCI), we obtain a unique panel
dataset containing information on more than 342,000 firms
spread across different types of ownership during the period
from 2011 to 2015. Our analysis confirms that corruption sands-
the-wheels, and deteriorates both firm performance and sur-
vivability significantly. These negative impacts are more severe
for new firms, suggesting that firms at the early stage of
development are more susceptible to corruption than their more
well-established counterparts. Moreover, the effects of corrup-
tion on the performance and survival of new firms do not appear
to be homogeneous across different types of ownership. Cor-
ruption is more detrimental to private firms, while exerting no
significant impact on the performance and survivability of
SOEs. On the other hand, foreign firms are able to take
advantage of corruption to enhance their performance and
sustainability. These results are consistent and robust regardless
of various model specifications.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2
presents a background of the economy of Vietnam; Section 3
discusses the data and research methodology, followed by the
empirical findings in Section 4; Section 5 provides additional
analyses and robustness tests; Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Background on Vietnam economy
For more than a decade after national reunification, Vietnam
has followed a central economic planning mechanism in which
SOEs were set as the major driving force of the economy,
serving as both production and social units (Turner & Nguyen,
2005). Nevertheless, after experiencing a poor economic per-
formance, the Vietnam Communist Party implemented the Doi
Moi (Renovation) political and economic reform in 1986,
1 The extensive anti-corruption campaign started in the 2010s, especially
after the establishment of the Central Steering Committee on Anti-Corruption,
which is directly administered by the Vietnamese Politburo and chaired by the
Party General Secretary. Accordingly, the Committee is responsible for
detecting and executing corruption and misconduct behaviour at both the state
and the enterprise levels. The campaign has achieved many concrete out-
comes: it has found violations of over VND 400,000 billion (equivalent to
USD 17 billion) and 18,525 ha (equivalent to 45,776 acres) of land through
inspection (Session 14, 2018), applied disciplinary procedures to 840 Party
agents and 58,120 Party members violating anti-corruption regulations. 490
Party agents and 35,000 Party members were punished (Nhân Dân, 2018).
2 Vietnam ranked 68th over 190 economies for the ease of doing business
(World Bank, 2017).
385V.H. Nam et al. / Borsa _Istanbul Review 20-4 (2020) 383e395aiming to transform the centrally planned economy to a market-
oriented one (Riedel & Turley, 1999). The country opens the
door and facilitates the liberalisation of the private market, trade
and investment (Turner & Nguyen, 2005).
Thereafter, the issuance of many legal documents, including
the Enterprise Law in 1999 and the Law on Investment in 2005,
has established an improved legal framework for promotion of
the private sector. The subsequent U.S. e Vietnam Bilateral
Trade Agreement (BTA) that was signed in 2000 helped to clear
the way for Vietnam's accession to the World Trade Organisa-
tion (WTO) in 2007, which marked a crucial step forward in the
development of Vietnam's economy. The transformation to a
market-oriented economy has resulted in a significant number
of new firm registrations. There was a tremendous increase
from 20,000 new firms per year in the 2000s to more than
90,000 new firms per year in the 2010s (GSO, 2017a). By the
end of 2015, there were 442,000 operating firms. This number
was 11.3 times higher than in 2000, which was the first year in
which the Enterprise Law took effect (GSO, 2017a). The
average growth rate of the domestic private sector was highest
at 18.9% per year, followed by the foreign invested sector with
a growth rate of 14.7% per year (GSO, 2017a). According to
Tran and To (2018), the private sector was the key contributor
to the spur of economic growth in Vietnam as it contributed
43.22% to the total GDP in 2017. By contrast, the growth rate
of the number of SOEs has been reduced by 4.4% per year,
partly due to the process of restructuring and privatising SOEs
(GSO, 2017a). Nonetheless, SOEs with huge cash injections
from the state budget and nonmonetary favours of the state
patronage still play an important role in critical industries such
as energy, telecommunications, and banking and finance.
There are, however, noticeable phenomena after three de-
cades of renovation in Vietnam. More than 90% of operating
firms are of small and medium size (MPI, 2017), of which
69% have less than 10 employees (GSO, 2017a). Although
these small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are an
important engine of economic development, they are more
vulnerable to market frictions and institutional failures (Beck
& Demirguc-Kunt, 2006), possibly because of resource scar-
city and dependence upon external infrastructure and systems
(Storey, 1994). As it happens, while a large number of firms
have been entering the market during the period from 2011 to
2017, the number of firms exiting the market was strikingly
high (National Business Registration Portal, 2017). According
to GSO (2017b), 2017 was the record year for newly registered
enterprises with 126,589 registrations. At the same time, more
than 60,000 firms stopped or went bankrupt.
Reasons for such duality are often cited as being compli-
cated regulations, insufficient support services, limited access
to capital and land, inconsistent implementation of govern-
ment rules across provinces and especially corruption (Beck &
Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Malesky, 2018; Tran, Grafton, &
Kompas, 2009). In the latest PCI report, Malesky (2018)
documents that high corruption levels are a major obstacle
to doing business in Vietnam. Corruption is found among
administrative cadres and public employees at the province
level where the provincial executives control most businessgovernment interactions (Bai, Jayachandran, Malesky, &
Olken, 2019) including business registration and licensing,
environmental and safety inspections, land and
budget allocation, construction permits and labour oversight
(Bai et al., 2019; Nguyen & Van Dijk, 2012).
Even though Vietnam has launched a rigorous anti-
corruption campaign1 to improve its business environment,
the country's ranking for ease of doing business remained low2
(World Bank, 2017). According to the PCI 2017 report, 70%
of firms perceived that a close relationship with the authorities
is vital for obtaining legal and planning documents (Malesky,
2018). More than two-thirds of surveyed respondents indicated
that unofficial payments were widespread; more than 10% of
these respondents reported that they paid a large amount for
corrupt activity, and more than half of them believed that
“commissions” would be needed to secure the government's
bids (Malesky, 2018). These observations raise a great concern
over the relationship between corruption and the operating
outcomes of newly established firms, making the economy of
Vietnam an ideal empirical setting to study the effects of
corruption on the performance of newly established enter-
prises in transition economies.
3. Description of data and variables3.1. DataThe main dataset used in this study is retrieved from the
AES conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam
(GSO) for the period from 2011 to 2015. The AES includes
information on tax identification, types of firm ownership (i.e.,
state-owned, foreign-owned and private-owned), operating sta-
tus, total assets, number of employees, employee gender, key
business performance indicators and other indicators. To miti-
gate the effect of outliers and data errors, we follow the liter-
ature (e.g., Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2013; Kayhan & Titman,
2007) and remove all financial, utility and cooperative firms
from the sample. We further eliminated firms with inadequate
information and firms that reported extreme or unbelievable
values. Based on the firms’ unique tax identification numbers,
we obtained a panel dataset of over 342,000 firms.
The second data source comes from the PCI database pro-
vided by VCCI and the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID). The PCI database was designed to
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ingness of provincial governments to develop business-friendly
regulatory environments for private sector development based
on the following criteria: low entry cost; easy access to land and
stable business premises, that is, the transparent business
environment where enterprises have equal access to necessary
information and legal documents for running the business; time
spent by the enterprise on carrying out the most restrictive
administrative and inspection procedures; unofficial fees to be
kept at a minimum; active and proactive provincial leaders;
business support services provided by the public and private
sectors; good labour training policies; the legal and judicial
system for the settlement of disputes fairly and effectively.
With these sources of data from AES and PCI, we obtain
and utilise unique and exhaustive cross-sectional time-series
data covering firms' characteristics and provincial institutional
qualities to shed light on the impact of corruption on new
firms’ performances.3 We do not consider firms which are less than 1 year old because, in our
specification, the dependent variable (firm performance) is regressed on the
lagged form of all right-hand-side variables to mitigate the endogeneity.3.2. Variables
3.2.1. Firm performance
Following Bhagat and Bolton (2008), and Vu, Tran,
Nguyen, and Lim (2016), we measure a firm's performance
using return on assets (ROA). ROA is calculated from dividing
a firm's net income by its total assets. This measure is
conventionally used in corporate finance literature as it
explicitly takes into account the assets required to run business
activities and, as such, enables firm managers and stakeholders
to evaluate both the business condition and the future pro-
spective of firms effectively.
3.2.2. Corruption
Meon and Sekkat (2005), Cuervo-Cazurra (2008), and
Iwasaki and Suzuki (2012) use the “Control of Corruption”,
provided by the World Bank and the “Corruption Perceptions
Index”, provided by the International Transparency to proxy for
corruption. These two data sources are only available at a na-
tional level. In Vietnam, the number of firms’ perceived of
corruption at the provincial level was considered as an appro-
priate corruption measure (Bai et al., 2019; Nguyen & Van Dijk,
2012; Vu et al., 2016). This measure is considered appropriate
because the interactions between business and government that
might involve corruption practices regarding business registra-
tion, government procurement and land permission happen at
the provincial level. The provincial leadership also exerts con-
trol over corruption practices of subordinate agencies, leading to
the relative homogeneity of corruption levels within a provincial
administration unit (Bai et al., 2019).
In our analysis, we proxy for local government corruption
levels by using the ‘Informal Payments’ indicator retrieved
from the Vietnam PCI database. The indicator measures the
perception of firms of the prevalence of corruption in the local
business environment, ranging from 0 to 10, with a higher
score representing a higher level of corruption control by the
provincial authorities. The use of an ‘Informal Payment’ as a
proxy for corruption has been a common practice in recentcorruption-related studies (i.e., Nguyen & Van Dijk, 2012; Bai
et al., 2019; Vu et al., 2016; Tran, 2019). We rescale this
measure by subtracting it from 10 so that a higher score in-
dicates a higher level of corruption.
3.2.3. Control variables
In this study, we incorporate a number of firm-specific
control variables in our empirical specification that might
determine firms' performances as suggested by previous
studies (e.g. Box, 2008; Brüderl et al., 1992; Wennberg et al.,
2010). Specifically, we incorporate SIZE, LEVERAGE, LA-
BOUR, FEMALE, TANGIBILITY, and TAXPAID. SIZE is the
variable indicating the size of a firm, which is measured by the
natural logarithm of the firm's total assets. LEVERAGE is the
debt-to-equity ratio, which is measured by dividing a firm's
liabilities by its total assets. LABOUR is measured by taking
the natural logarithm of the total number of employees. FE-
MALE is the percentage of female members in the total
number of employees. TANGIBILITY is the natural logarithm
of the tangible assets. Finally, TAXPAID is measured by taking
the natural logarithm of the amount of tax a firm paid. Sum-
mary statistics for our main variables are reported in Table 1.
The correlation matrix is provided in Table 2.
4. Empirical analysis4.1. Corruption and firm performance e new firms
versus mature firmsTo examine whether corruption exerts different effects on
the new firms and their mature counterparts, we employ a
contingency model in which firm performance is regressed on
corruption, a dummy variable indicating new firms and their
interaction term as follows:
pit¼d0 þ d1CORRUPTIONit1 þ d2CORRUPTIONit1
NEW FIRMit1 þ d03Xjit1 þ qt þ4i þ mit; ð1Þ
where pit is the performance (ROA) of firm i at time t;
CORRUPTION is the firm's perception of the prevalence of
‘informal payment’ in the provincial business environment;
NEW FIRM is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if
a firm is newly established and 0 otherwise. Following
Williams (2004), we define new firms as those having no more
than 2, 3, 4, and 5 years of being established.3 In addition, we
incorporate a vector of control variables Xjit ¼ [SIZE,
LEVERAGE, LABOUR, FEMALE, TANGIBILITY, TAXPAID]
that may have influence over firm performance and is used
commonly in the corporate finance literature (i.e., Brüderl
et al., 1992; Box, 2008; Wennberg et al., 2010). 4i and
qt are firm and year fixed effects, which are employed to ac-
count for the unobserved firm-specific characteristics and
Table 1
Summary statistics.
Observation Mean Std. Dev. 25th t 75th
Panel A: All firms
ROA 818,016 0.016 0.228 0.010 0.000 0.008
CORRUPTION 818,016 5.916 1.077 4.676 6.000 6.667
SIZE 818,016 8.446 1.565 7.467 8.374 9.320
LEVERAGE 818,016 0.636 1.577 0.375 0.645 1.000
LABOR 818,016 2.091 1.283 1.099 1.792 2.708
FEMALE 818,016 0.341 0.220 0.200 0.333 0.500
TANGIBILITY 818,016 0.207 0.388 0.051 0.108 0.268
TAXPAID 818,016 3.263 2.431 1.099 3.270 4.966
Panel B: State-owned firms (SOEs)
ROA 7549 0.023 0.187 0.001 0.017 0.055
CORRUPTION 7549 5.842 1.092 4.852 5.754 6.667
SIZE 7549 11.488 1.908 10.185 11.430 12.725
LEVERAGE 7549 0.717 0.609 0.396 0.763 1.000
LABOUR 7549 4.812 1.472 3.807 4.836 5.768
FEMALE 7549 0.329 0.199 0.175 0.298 0.453
TANGIBILITY 7549 0.545 0.507 0.152 0.412 0.848
TAXPAID 7549 7.612 2.785 6.163 7.813 9.369
Panel B: Private domestic firms
ROA 786,842 0.014 0.218 0.009 0.000 0.007
CORRUPTION 786,842 5.915 1.075 4.676 6.000 6.667
SIZE 786,842 8.373 1.489 7.440 8.328 9.244
LEVERAGE 786,842 0.628 1.010 0.375 0.642 1.000
LABOUR 786,842 2.023 1.201 1.099 1.792 2.639
FEMALE 786,842 0.338 0.218 0.200 0.333 0.500
TANGIBILITY 786,842 0.197 0.358 0.050 0.105 0.253
TAXPAID 786,842 3.156 2.329 1.099 3.207 4.850
Panel C: FDI firms
ROA 23,625 0.072 0.459 0.084 0.002 0.066
CORRUPTION 23,625 5.993 1.136 4.768 6.006 6.667
SIZE 23,625 10.273 2.111 8.914 10.296 11.648
LEVERAGE 23,625 0.913 7.578 0.365 0.774 1.000
LABOUR 23,625 3.853 1.890 2.398 3.784 5.198
FEMALE 23,625 0.458 0.265 0.250 0.438 0.667
TANGIBILITY 23,625 0.467 0.902 0.065 0.348 0.696
TAXPAID 23,625 5.894 3.201 3.714 6.358 8.248
Table 2
Pairwise correlation matrix.
VIF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. ROA 1
2. CORRUPTION 1.09 0.012 1
3. AGE 1.14 0.029 0.104 1
4. SIZE 1.72 0.134 0.127 0.228 1
5. LEVERAGE 1.01 0.032 0.020 0.005 0.037 1
6. LABOUR 1.73 0.023 0.059 0.308 0.554 0.009 1
7. FEMALE 1.02 0.011 0.030 0.037 0.027 0.014 0.076 1
8. TANGIBILITY 1.04 0.010 0.033 0.105 0.040 0.016 0.158 0.020 1
9. TAXPAID 1.51 0.119 0.116 0.212 0.496 0.060 0.474 0.056 0.096 1
4 It is worth noting that the R2 values in our models are relatively small (i.e.,
1.2%). This suggests that our models only explain a modest proportion of the
variance in firm performance in our samples. However, it neither suggests that
our estimations are biased nor influences the statistically significant explana-
tory power of our models. In fact, a small R2 has been reported in several
papers employing large data sets of enterprises in Vietnam, such as Nguyen
and Van Dijk (2012), De Jong, Tu, and van Ees (2012) and Vu et al. (2016).
Thus, we are convinced that small R2 should not pose a serious concern to the
validity and reliability of our results.
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a potential endogeneity problem, we follow Iwasaki and
Suzuki (2012) and Gyimah-Brempong and de Camacho
(2006) to take the lag of all right-hand-side variables for one
year, which can be used as predetermined variables in our
models.
The regression results are presented in Table 3. The esti-
mated coefficients of CORRUPTION are negative and signif-
icant, suggesting that corruption is sand-the-wheels thatsignificantly deters firm performance. Our results are consis-
tent with the findings from previous studies including Wei
(2000), Svensson (2005), and Nguyen and Van Dijk (2012).
The estimated coefficients of the interaction terms between
CORRUPTION and NEW FIRM are negative and statistically
significant, regardless of the classification of new firms.4
These results provide strong evidence that corruption ex-
hibits more detrimental effects on the performance of new
firms compared to their more mature counterparts. It is likely
that, at the early stage of the corporate cycle, corruption raises
operating expenses and prevents firms from allocating their
scarce resources effectively for profitable activities. In addi-
tion, new firms, with their lack of knowledge and business
skills, can suffer from immense difficulties in handling the
risks of bribe extraction by public officials and the partner-
related risks in a corrupt environment, leading to lower per-
formance. On the other hand, as firms grow older, they acquire
business skills and information through a searching and
learning process, making corruption less detrimental to their
performance (Shepherd et al., 2000).4.2. Corruption and firm performance: does ownership
matter?As discussed earlier, in transition economies, the effect of
corruption on firm performance might vary across different
types of firm ownership. While SOEs might make use of their
relationship with the government to avoid bribe extraction and
pursue rent-seeking, private and FDI firms without well-
established political connections might be subjected to gov-
ernment exploitation in a corrupt environment. Thus, in this
section, we investigate how corruption affects the performance
of firms with different types of ownership. To do so, we split
Table 3
The effect of corruption on firm performance: new firms vs. mature firms.
Dependent variable: ROA
Firms under 2-year of age Firms under 3-year of age Firms under 4-year of age Firms under 5-year of age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CORRUPTION 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
NEW FIRM 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.013** 0.010*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
CORRUPTION  NEW FIRM 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LEVERAGE 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LABOUR 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
FEMALE 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
TANGIBILITY 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TAXPAID 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000)
Firm dummies YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
R2 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
Number of obs. 818,016 818,016 818,016 818,016
Number of firms 342,104 342,104 342,104 342,104
Note: Constants are excluded for brevity. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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private domestic firms, and FDI firms, respectively, and then
re-estimate Equation (1). The estimation results of the sub-
samples of SOEs, private domestic firms and FDI firms are
presented in Columns 1e4, Columns 5e8 and Columns 9e12,
respectively, of Table 4.
As shown in Columns 1 to 4, the estimated coefficients of
CORRUPTION and its interaction terms with new firm
dummies are not statistically significant. This result is
consistent across different ways of new firm classification,
indicating that corruption exerts no significant impact on the
performance of SOEs. This finding supports the supposition
that, in a transition economy, SOEs might utilise their rela-
tionship and alignment of interests with government officials
to protect themselves from the risks of bribe extraction, as well5 One might argue that the insignificant effects of corruption on newly
established SOEs found in columns 1 to 4 are due to the relatively small
sample size of SOEs compared to that of domestic private firms. (The sample
size of SOEs is only 7549 firm-year observations, while that of domestic
private firms comprises up to 787,010 firm-year observations.) To address this
concern, we randomly select a sample of 7549 firm-year observations from the
domestic private firms to ensure that the results could be comparable between
the two groups of state-owned firms and private domestic firms. Models 5 to 8
are re-estimated accordingly. The estimated coefficients of CORRUP-
TIONNEW FIRM remain negative and statistically significant, suggesting a
detrimental effect of corruption on the performance of newly established do-
mestic private firms. This result mitigates the concern that our results are
driven by discrepancies in sample sizes between state-owned and private firms.
For the sake of brevity, these results are not reported here. However, they are
available upon request.as from the risks of paying the bribe without receiving any
commensurate benefits. Such a political connection might also
endow them with priorities in obtaining public favours, spe-
cialised licenses, and government contracts that are vital to
obtaining competitive advantages. Thus, SOEs in transition
economies like Vietnam are in a position that isolates them
from any negative impact of corruption.
Meanwhile, the estimated coefficients of CORRUPTION
are negative and statistically significant in Columns 5 to 8,
suggesting that corruption is harmful to the performance of
domestic private firms.5 This is not a surprising result because,
as opposed to SOEs, private domestic firms often lack political
connections and, therefore, privileged treatment by govern-
ment officials. In the context of transition economies where
the use of bribes by public officials to gain self-interest is
rampant, private domestic firms have to confront excessive
bureaucratic burdens and government exploitation directly,
which subsequently hinders their performance. It is worth
noting that the negative influence of corruption is more pro-
nounced for the group of new firms, as indicated by the
negative and significant coefficients of the interaction terms
CORRRUPTIONNEW FIRM.
With regard to FDI firms, the coefficients of CORRUP-
TION in Columns 9 to 12 are not statistically significant.
Nevertheless, the estimated coefficient of the interaction terms
CORRUPTIONNEW FIRM are negative and statistically
significant in all model specifications, indicating that corrup-
tion exerts a negative impact on the group of new FDI firms.
This might be because, as opposed to more mature FDI firms,
Table 4



























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
CORRUPTION 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
CORRUPTION
 NEW FIRM
0.005 0.015 0.007 0.004 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.025** 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.018**
(0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
NEW FIRM 0.032 0.134** 0.065 0.027 0.028*** 0.015** 0.011** 0.009* 0.161** 0.229*** 0.209*** 0.153***
(0.077) (0.062) (0.055) (0.049) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.080) (0.062) (0.059) (0.053)
SIZE 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008** 0.008**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
LEVERAGE 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LABOUR 0.017** 0.018** 0.017** 0.017** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
FEMALE 0.036* 0.035* 0.035* 0.035* 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
TANGIBILITY 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
TAXPAID 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
Number of obs. 7549 7549 7549 7549 787,010 787,010 787,010 787,010 23,647 23,647 23,647 23,647
Number of firms 3525 3525 3525 3525 335,939 335,939 335,939 335,939 11,904 11,904 11,904 11,904
Note: Constants are excluded for brevity. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.




































390 V.H. Nam et al. / Borsa _Istanbul Review 20-4 (2020) 383e395new foreign entrants might fall short of the local sense and
political connections to cope with host country corruption,
hence suffering from lower firm performance under the in-
fluence of corruption.
5. Additional analyses
The previous section reveals that corruption is more
harmful to new firms than it is to mature firms. However, far-
reaching implications cannot be drawn at this stage because it
is not clear how and in which circumstances new firms
respond to corruption. The drawback of the analysis presented
above is that all of the tests do not explicitly impose any re-
striction on firm age. If corruption is correlated with unob-
servable specific features of new firms, such as possessing
limited skills and networks to deal with corrupt government
officials and rigid government processes, ignorance of such a
variation would lead to estimation bias. While the setting in
the previous sections allows us to have a comparative analysis
between both new and more mature firms, the results only fall
within particular types of ownership and we cannot see how
new private domestic firms behave and perform in comparison
to new foreign firms and new state-owned firms. We may also
suffer from the problem of overfitting if the group of new
firms’ accounts for a proportion of the total number of firms
that is either too small or too large.
We refine our analysis to examine the effect of corruption
on a sub-sample containing only new firms. Unfortunately,
there is no consensus and clear-cut definition of new firms in
the literature. In this paper, we classify new firms as those with
no more than three years of establishment.6 The rationale
behind this threshold is that a period of three years after
establishment is generally considered to be a critical milestone
during a firm's life span. As observed by Gibbs (1990), the
highest failure hazards occur within the first three years of
operation, making this period the “valley of death” for new
entrants. In the context of Vietnam, 90% of start-ups are on the
verge of bankruptcy in less than three years of operation (Anh,
2018). Once they have surpassed this period, new firms are
closer to being a prospect for success. Empirical research
using this upper bound of firm age to delineate new firms
includes, for example, Cooper et al. (1994). As a result, our
dataset contains 320,912 firm-year observations that meet this
sample formation criterion.6 In entrepreneurship research, a new firm is also defined as one operating
for 6 years or less after the start of business activities (Baum & Locke, 2004).
To provide further robustness to our result, we alternatively examine the ef-
fects of corruption on the group of new firms using different operating win-
dows. Specifically, we define new firms as those with no more than 2 years (i.e.
, Baum, Locke, & Kirkpatrick, 1998), 4 years (i.e., Rauch, Frese, & Utsch,
2005) and 6 years (i.e., see Littunen, 2000) since establishment. Our results
remain consistent and robust, thus reinforcing the previous findings that cor-
ruption affects the performance and sustainability of new firms negatively. For
the sake of brevity, these results are not reported here. However, they are
available upon request.5.1. Does corruption affect the performance of new
firms?To examine the effect of corruption on the performance of
new firms, the following specification is employed:
pit¼d0 þ d1CORRUPTIONit þ d02Xjit þ qt þ4i þ ε1it ð2Þ
where i denotes firm i at time t. Performance is measured by
ROA. Xjit1is a set of control variables that have influence over
performance. ε1itis the error term. Firm fixed effects ð4iÞ and
year fixed effects (qtÞare incorporated to account for the un-
observed firm-specific characteristics and time-invariant in-
fluences. We use lagged right-hand-side variables to mitigate
potential endogeneity problems. To investigate more about
whether the effects of corruption on the performance of new
firms differ across various types of firms, we include interac-
tion terms between corruption (CORRUPTION ) and dummy
variables indicating private domestic firms (PRIVATE ), state-
owned enterprises (SOE ), and foreign firms (FDI ).
The regression results are reported in Table 5. The esti-
mated coefficients of CORRUPTION are negative and statis-
tically significant, thus supporting the result reported earlier
that corruption significantly deteriorates firm performance.
However, the results from Columns 3 and 4 confirm that
corruption does not affect the performance of SOEs as the
estimated coefficients on SOE dummy and CORRUP-
TIONSOE are not statistically significant.
The estimated coefficients of PRIVATE in Columns 5 and 6
are both positive and statistically significant, suggesting that
new private firms perform better than others. Nevertheless,
corruption imposes more harmful effects on the performance
of new private firms as the estimated coefficient on the
interaction term between CORRUPTION and PRIVATE is
negative and significant.
For FDI firms, the positive and significant coefficients of
CORRUPTIONFDI illustrates that new foreign firms with
less than three years of establishment suffer less detrimental
effects from corruption. This is not a surprising result because
new foreign firms might be willing to pay bribes to transcend
the bureaucratic burden during the entry process.5.2. Corruption and the failure of newly established
firmsWe expand our analysis to study how corruption affects the
failure probability of new firms using the Cox proportional
hazard model, which is an approach that has been used
commonly in the studies of new firm survival (Audretsch,
Houweling, & Thurik, 2000). In this study, we rely on the
operating status disclosed in the survey dataset and we decide
that a firm fails in a given year if its operating status is coded
2, 3 or 4, which equates to “Stop operation for investment or
technological innovation”, “Stop operation for dissolution or
merger” and “Stop operation for other reasons”, respectively.
Following the literature, the hazard function hðtjxiÞ of a firm is
specified as follows:
Table 5
Effects of corruption on the performance of newly established firms.
Firm Performance (ROA)
All new firms SOE Private FDI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CORRUPTION 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LEVERAGE 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
LABOUR 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
FEMALE 0.021*** 0.0208*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
TANGIBILITY 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
TAXPAID 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SOE 0.027 0.033
(0.024) (0.022)








CORRUPTION  FDI 0.003*
(0.002)
Firm fixed effects NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015
No. Firms 195,039 195,039 195,039 195,039 195,039 195,039 195,039 195,039
No. Obs. 320,912 320,912 320,912 320,912 320,912 320,912 320,912 320,912
Note: Constants are excluded for brevity. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.





where h0ðtÞ is an arbitrary and unspecified baseline hazard
function that presents the failure probability of firm i having
survived until time t, and X0itb is the suitable function of
covariates, in which b is the vector of unknown parameters to
be estimated. In this study, the following function of X0itb is
employed:
X0itb¼d0 þ d1CORRit þ d02Xjit þ ε2it; ð4Þ
where i denotes firm i, t denotes year t, Xjit is the control vector
of firm-specific characteristics, and ε2it is the error term.
Table 6 presents the results of the Cox Proportional Hazard
to predict firm failure. The coefficients of CORRUPTION are
positive and significant in all of the specifications (except for
Column 6), thus providing further support for the detrimental
effect of corruption on new firm survival. In Column 3, the
estimated coefficient of SOE is positive and significant, sug-
gesting that new SOEs are more likely to fail than other types of
new firms. Nevertheless, both the estimated coefficients of SOE
and on its interaction term with CORRUPTION are notstatistically significant, indicating that corruption does not
affect the SOEs. The estimated coefficient on PRIVATE in
Column 5 is negative and significant. Nonetheless, the coeffi-
cient of CORRUPTIONPRIVATE is positive and significant,
indicating that new private domestic firms are more susceptible
to the failure risks as the level of corruption increases.
By contrast, the significant and positive coefficient on FDI
in Column 7 implies that FDI firms suffer a higher hazard rate
than other firms. The estimated coefficient of CORRUP-
TIONFDI in Column 8 is negative and significant, indicating
that corruption is less detrimental to the survival of FDI firms
when compared to their domestic counterparts.5.3. Other robustness testsTo ensure the robustness of our results, we perform
additional tests, including tests using the IV-2SLS and GMM
estimators to control for any possible endogeneity bias
further. We first re-estimate our baseline model using the
traditional IV-2SLS estimator with instrumental variables
that are correlated to the endogenous CORRUPTION vari-
able, although not correlated with the error term or the
Table 6
Corruption and corporate failure e controlling for types of ownership.
Cox Proportional Hazard Model
All new firms SOE Private FDI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CORRUPTION 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.207 0.047*** 0.049***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.124) (0.012) (0.012)
SIZE 0.067*** 0.131*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
LEVERAGE 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
LABOUR 1.093*** 0.047 1.094*** 1.094*** 1.093*** 1.094*** 1.093*** 1.093***
(0.018) (0.031) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
FEMALE 0.138*** 1.122*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.138***
(0.035) (0.019) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
TANGIBILITY 0.052*** 0.404*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052***
(0.007) (0.038) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
TAXPAID 0.028*** 0.042*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ROA 0.014 0.012* 0.015 0.015 0.027 0.027 0.024 0.024
(0.032) (0.005) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
SOE 1.734*** 4.263
(0.319) (2.253)








CORRUPTION  FDI 0.256**
(0.128)
Industry dummies NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
No. Firms 252,762 252,762 252,762 252,762 252,762 252,762 252,762 252,762
No. Obs. 493,477 493,477 493,477 493,477 493,477 493,477 493,477 493,477
Note: Constants are excluded for brevity. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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including the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity, the
Sargan test for over-identification restrictions, and the
Hansen-J statistics for under-identification restrictions are
performed to ensure that the model is well specified. We
employ the tenure of the Secretary of the Communist Party
Committee as the provincial level measured by the number
of months the Secretary has been in office (TENURE ), and
the dummy indicating that there was a switch in the pro-
vincial leadership in a given year (SWITCH ) as the two in-
struments. The length of the provincial leader has been
suggested to be associated with provincial governance
quality in the way that a short tenure may create more in-
centives for the leader to pursue rent extraction, engage in
corrupt activities and neglect management practices (Tran,
2019), thereby exacerbating the severity of corruption. The
higher frequency of switch represents short tenure and the
new leader's relatively incomprehensive knowledge of local
administration and management might temporarily lead to
intensified corruption severity (Nguyen, Mickiewicz, & Du,
2018). Next, we control for endogeneity bias further by
using the dynamic GMM estimation. Additionally, followingthe method of Arellano and Bond (1991), we adopt the two-
step system GMM estimator with the use of a combination of
internal IVs, external IVs, and suitable lag of the endogenous
corruption variable.
Overall, while the results of the IV approach lend some
support to our specification reported earlier, it appears that
panel fixed-effect models provide more robust and consistent
empirical results. Specifically, despite a number of econo-
metric techniques being adopted to control for the endogeneity
bias, including the use of the IV-2SLS, dynamic GMM and
two-step system GMM estimators with alternative IVs,
different lag structures and time periods, the results hardly
appear to be consistent across all specifications. In addition,
the specification tests (i.e., Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, Sargan
test, Hansen-J statistics, AR (1) and AR (2) tests) rarely
indicate that the models are well-specified. In this context,
although one might argue that fixed-effect estimators cannot
control for endogeneity bias completely, since the results for
the main variables of interest are quantitatively similar to those
attained from IV-2SLS and GMM models, we are convinced
that endogeneity is not a major problem that drives our results
to estimation bias.
393V.H. Nam et al. / Borsa _Istanbul Review 20-4 (2020) 383e395With regard to the specification to predict firm failure, we
estimate the Hazard Model (2) under different distributional
assumptions for the baseline hazard function, including
Exponential, Weibull and Log-logistics. The regression results
are largely similar to the results using the Cox proportional
hazard model, regardless of the specification being employed.
Therefore, this reinforces our finding that corruption has an
adverse effect on the survival of new firms.
Furthermore, following Jiang and Nie (2014) and Tran
(2019), we employ alternative proxies for firm performance.
Specifically, we use ROI (return on investment), ROS (return
on sales), and revenue growth as indicators of firm perfor-
mance and apply the same regression specifications. While
these tests provide some support for our findings, the results
are less significant than the results reported using ROA as a
performance indicator.
For the sake of brevity, these results are not reported here.
However, they are available upon request.
6. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the growing body of research
examining the corruptioneentrepreneurship nexus by
providing empirical evidence on the effects of corruption on
the performance of new firms. Using a large sample of firms in
Vietnam, a transition economy, our study reveals that cor-
ruption exerts significantly negative effects on both firm per-
formance and sustainability. We also find that corruption is
more detrimental to new firms compared to the more mature
firms, probably because new firms with insufficient resources,
business skills and expertise might be exposed to an exces-
sively high level of costs and risks in a corrupted environment,
leading to deteriorated performance and a higher rate of fail-
ure. Our study further shows that corruption is less deleterious
to new FDI and state-owned firms. On the contrary, corruption
imposes more harmful effects on the performance and survival
of private domestic firms.
Our results provide implications for policymakers and
regulators in transition economies, who are trying to establish
a conducive environment for the development of new busi-
nesses, by showing that corruption is a major obstacle that
might deteriorate the performance and sustainability of newly
established firms significantly. Corruption creates a condition
that favours new state-owned and new foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) entrants, while hindering the performance of new
firms in private sectors, suggesting that corruption might
distort the business environment and lead to a reduction in the
overall efficiency in the economy. As a result, increased
government attention and efforts should be made to design
more effective and rigorous anti-corruption measures to ease
the way of doing business further and enhance the viability
and economic significance of the new private firms. Our re-
sults also suggest that ensuring adequate financial resources,
knowledge and skills for dealing with corruption is a feasible
way to promote and sustain the businesses of new private firms
in transition economies.Declaration of Competing Interest
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